What can we do for him? Certainly we
cannot serve What can we do for him? Certainly we
cannot serve Belgium?s cause by being hemmed in and starved
out. Our only hope is victory, and England will never quit the war
whatever happens till Hitler is beat or we cease to be a State.
Trust you will make sure he leaves with you by aeroplane before
too late. Should our operation prosper and we establish [anover at full speed. They must
be distributed in at least four fast ships. Could not some of them
come by passenger liner? Let me know what Admiralty can do.
Make sure there is no delay at Purco?s [Purchasing Commissionshould be most leniently viewed,
even if the consequences are not pleasant.
1. Mr. Dulanty is thoroughly friendly to England. He was an officer under me
in the Ministry of Munitions in 1917/18, but he has no control or authority in
Southern Ireland (so-called Eire). He acts as a general smoother,
representing everything Irish in the most favourable light. Three-quarters of
the people of Southern Ireland are with us, but the implacable, malignant
minority can make so much trouble that De Valera dare not do anything to
offend them. All this talk about partition and the bitterness that would be
healed by a union of Northern and Southern Ireland will amount to nothing.
They will not unite at the present time, and we cannot in any circumstances
sell the loyalists of Northern Ireland. Will you kindly consider these
observations as the basis upon which Admiralty dealings with Southern
Ireland should proceed?
2. There seems to be a good deal of evidence, or at any rate suspicion, that
the U-boats are being succoured from West of Ireland ports by the
malignant section with whom De Valera dare not interfere. And we are
debarred from using Berehaven, etc. If the U-boat campaign became more
dangerous we should coerce Southern Ireland both about coast watching
and the use of Berehaven, etc. However, if it slackens off under our counter -
attacks and protective measures, the Cabinet will not be inclined to face the
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others. 24.IX.39.
First Lord to First Sea Lord, D.C.N.S. and D.N.I. (For general
guidance.) (Most secret.)
24.IX.39.
556
serious issues which forcible measures would entail. It looks therefore as if
the present bad situation will continue for the present. But the Admiralty
should never cease to formulate through every channel its complaints about
it, and I will from time to time bring our grievances before the Cabinet. On
no account must we appear to acquiesce in, still less be contented with, the
odious treatment we are receiving.
While anxious not to fetter in any way the discretion of C.-in-C., Home Fleet,
I think it might be as well for you to point out that the sending of heavy
ships far out into the North Sea will certainly entail bombing attacks from
aircraft, and will not draw German warships from their harbours. Although
there were no hits on the last occasion, there might easily have been losses
disproportionate to the tactical objects in view. This opinion was expressed
to me by several Cabinet colleagues.
The first brush between the Fleet and the air has passed off very well, and
useful data have been obtained, but we do not want to run unnecessary
risks with our important vessels until their A.A. has been worked up to the
required standard against aircraft flying 250 miles an hour.4
Surely the account you give of all these various disconnected Statistical
Branches constitutes the case for a central body which should grip together
all Admiralty statistics, and present them to me in a form increasingly
simplified and graphic.
I want to know at the end of each week everything we have got, all the
people we are employing, the progress of all vessels, works of construction,
the progress of all munitions affecting us, the state of our merchant
tonnage, together with losses, and numbers of every branch of the R.N. and
R.M. The whole should be presented in a small book such as was kept for
me by Sir Walter Layton when he was my statistical officer at the Ministry of
Munitions in 1917 and 1918. Every week I had this book, which showed the
past and the weekly progress, and also drew attention to what was lagging.
In an hour or two I was able to cover the whole ground, as I knew exactly
what to look for and where.
How do you propose this want of mine should be met?
OCTOBER, 1939
First Lord to First Sea Lord and D.C.N.S. 29.IX.39.
First Lord to Secretary. 30.IX.39
557
The First Lord's Statistical Branch should consist of Professor Lindemann,
who would do this besides his scientific activities, and a secretary who
knows the Admiralty, a statistician, and a confidential typist who is also
preferably an accountant. The duties of this branch will be:
1. To present to the First Lord a weekly picture of the progress of all new
construction, showing delays from contract dates, though without
inquiring into the causes, upon which First Lord will make his own
inquiries.
2. To present return of all British or British-controlled merchant ships
together with losses under various heads and new construction or
acquisition? also forecasts of new deliveries.
(a) during the week,
(b) since the war began;
3. To record the consumption weekly and since war began of all
ammunition, torpedoes, oil, etc., together with new deliveries, i.e.,
weekly and since the war began, monthly or weekly outputs and
forecasts.
4. To keep a complete continuous statistical survey of Fleet Air Arm,
going not only into aircraft but pilots, guns and equipment of all
kinds, and point out all apparent lag.
5. To present a monthly survey of the losses of personnel of all kinds.
6. To keep records of inquiries and any special papers relating to numbers
and strength provided by First Lord.
7. To make special inquiries, analysing for First Lord Cabinet Papers and
papers from other Departments which have a statistical character, as
requested by First Lord.
As soon as the personnel of the department is settled after discussion with
Professor Lindemann, who should also advise on any additions to the above
list of duties, a Minute must be given to all departments to make the
necessary returns to Statistical Branch (to be called ?S?) at the times
required, and to afford any necessary assistance.
Air Supply
October 16, 1939.
First Lord to Secretary. 9.X.39.
558
This most interesting paper is encouraging, but it does not touch the
question on which the War Cabinet sought information? namely, the
disparity between the monthly output of new aircraft, and the number of
squadrons composing the first-line air strength of the R.A.F. We were told in
1937 that there would be 1,750 first-line aircraft modernly equipped by April
1, 1938 (see Sir Thomas Inskip's speeches). However, the House of
Commons was content with the statement that this position had in fact been
realised by April 1, 1939. We were throughout assured that reserves far
above the German scale were the feature of the British system. We now
have apparently only about 1,500 first-line aircraft with good reserves ready
for action. On mobilisation the 125 squadrons of April 1, 1939, shrank to 96.
It is necessary to know how many new squadrons will be fully formed during
the months of November, December, January, and February. It is difficult to
understand why, with a production of fighting machines which has averaged
over seven hundred a month since May, and is now running even higher,
only a handful of squadrons have been added to our first-line strength, and
why that strength is below what we were assured was so reached in April of
this year. One would have thought with outputs so large, and pilots so
numerous, we should have been able to add ten or fifteen squadrons a
month to our first-line air strength; and no explanation is furnished why this
cannot happen. Then squadrons of sixteen each, with one hundred per cent
reserves, would only amount to 320 a month, or much less than half the
output from the factories. The Cabinet ought to be told what are the limiting
factors. They should be told this in full detail. Is it pilots or mechanics or
higher ground staff or guns or instruments of any kind? We ought not,
surely, to continue in ignorance of the reasons which prevent the heavy
outputs of the factories from being translated into a fighting-front of firstline
aircraft organised in squadrons. It may be impossible to remedy this,
but at any rate we ought to examine it without delay. It is not production
that is lagging behind, but the formation of fighting units with their full
reserve upon the approved scale.
I am very much obliged to the Director of Scientific Research for his
interesting memorandum [on the Admiralty Research Departmentdiscussed situation in Crete. Admiral
Cunningham emphasised the value of possession of Crete to us
as a means of securing Eastern Mediterranean and of interfering
with Italian transit traffic to North Africa. It would not, however,
be possible to base fleet on Suda Bay for more than a few hours
at a time at present owing to lack of anti-submarine protection.
He does not consider Italian attempt to take Crete is to be
anticipated in the near future, nor unless and until Greece is
overrun. He and Wavell have concerted arrangements for sending
Mr. Eden to Prime Minister.
3.XI.40.
534
at once to Crete a part of the reinforcements referred to in my
telegram of November 1. Admiral Cunningham does not consider
it is necessary to keep any large British military garrison in Crete,
and is convinced that once the Cretans are organised, one
battalion, together with anti-aircraft defences, would suffice. We
then discussed the general question of help to Greece. As we said
on September 22, ?any assistance we may be able to give to
Greece cannot be given until German-Italian threat to Egypt is
finally liquidated, the security of Egypt being vital to our strategy
and incidentally to the future of Greece.? ?
Chief cry for help is for air reinforcements. Number 30 Blenheim
Squadron left today for Athens. Longmore again emphasised his
extreme reluctance to add any more squadrons to the Greek
commitment in present conditions. He feels that to do so would
lead to a large wastage of his aircraft from Italian attack whilst
the aircraft are on Greek or Cretan aerodromes unprepared with
protecting pens, adequate ground anti-aircraft defence, and other
precautions of such nature, which are difficult to improvise at
short notice? .In general all Commanders-in-Chief were strongly
of the opinion that the defence of Egypt is of paramount
importance to our whole position in the Middle East. They
consider that from the strategical point of view the security of
Egypt is the most urgent commitment, and must take precedence
of attempts to prevent Greece being overrun. It is also essential if
we are to retain the support of Turkey? .
He added in my private cipher the following:
5.XI.40.
Although reinforcements ordered in Chiefs of Staffs? telegrams
involve additional risks in Western Desert and probably increased
casualties, these risks must be faced in view of political
commitments to aid Greece. Withdrawal, though it will hamper
arrangements made in Western Desert, will not entirely dislocate
them. But any increase in commitment or attempt to hasten rate
of despatch to Greece beyond that now laid down will mean
535
serious risk to our position in Egypt. Uncertain factor still remains
date by which air reinforcements, particularly fighters, arrive in
Egypt to replace those sent to Greece. Experience hitherto shows
that previous forecasts have not been fulfilled and time-table is
sadly behind. Now feel that there is nothing further I can do
here, and propose leave tomorrow morning by air.
* * * * *
The Secretary of State for War got back home on November 8, and came that
evening after the usual raid had begun to see me in my temporary
underground abode in Piccadilly. He brought with him the carefully guarded
secret which I wished I had known earlier. Nevertheless, no harm had been
done. Mr. Eden unfolded in considerable detail to a select circle, including the
C.I.G.S. and General Ismay, the offensive plan which General Wavell and
General Wilson had conceived and prepared. No longer were we to await in
our fortified lines at Mersa Matruh an Italian assault, for which defensive
battle such long and artful preparations had been made. On the contrary,
within a month or so we were ourselves to attack. The operation was to be
called ?Compass.?
As will be seen from the map, Marshal Graziani?s Italian army, then above
eighty thousand strong, which had crossed the Egyptian frontier, was spread
over a fifty-mile front in a series of fortified camps, which were separated by
wide distances and not mutually supporting, and with no depth in the system.
Between the enemy?s right flank at Sofafi and his next camp at Nibeiwa there
was a gap of over twenty miles. The plan was to make an offensive spring
through this gap, and, turning towards the sea, attack Nibeiwa camp and the
Tummar group of camps in succession from the west ? that is to say, from the
rear. Meanwhile, both the Sofafi camps and the camp at Meiktila, on the
coast, were to be contained by light forces. For this purpose there were to be
employed the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Indian Division, now complete,
and the 16th British Infantry Brigade, together with a composite force from
the garrison of Mersa Matruh. This plan involved a serious risk, but also
offered a glittering prize. The risk lay in the launching of all our best troops
into the heart of the enemy?s position by a move of seventy miles on two
successive nights over the open desert, and with the peril of being observed
and attacked from the air during the intervening day. Besides this, the food
536
and petrol had to be nicely calculated, and if the time-scale went wrong the
consequences must be grave.
The prize was worthy of the hazard. The arrival of our vanguard on the sea at
Buq Buq or thereabouts would cut the communications of three-quarters of
Marshal Graziani?s army. Attacked by surprise from the rear, they might well
be forced as a result of vigorous fighting into mass surrenders. In this case
the Italian front would be irretrievably broken. With all their best troops
captured or destroyed, no force would be left capable of withstanding a
further onslaught, nor could any organised retreat be made to Tripoli along
the hundreds of miles of coastal road.
Here, then, was the deadly secret which the Generals had talked over with
their Secretary of State for War. This was what they had not wished to
telegraph. We were all delighted. I purred like six cats. Here was something
worth doing. It was decided there and then, subject to the agreement of the
Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet, to give immediate sanction and all
possible support to this splendid enterprise, and that it should take first place
in all our thoughts and have, amid so many other competing needs, first claim
upon our strained resources.
In due course these proposals were brought before the War Cabinet. I was
ready to state the case or have it stated. But when my colleagues learned that
the Generals on the spot and the Chiefs of Staff were in full agreement with
me and Mr. Eden, they declared that they did not wish to know the details of
the plan, that the fewer who knew them the better, and that they wholeheartedly
approved the general policy of the offensive. This was the attitude
which the War Cabinet adopted on several important occasions, and I record it
here that it may be a model, should similar dangers and difficulties arise in
future times.
* * * * *
The Italian Fleet had not reacted in any way against our occupation of Crete,
but Admiral Cunningham had for some time been anxious to strike a blow at
them with his now augmented naval air forces as they lay in their main base
at Taranto. The attack was delivered on November 11 as the climax of a wellconcerted
series of operations, during which Malta received troops, and
further naval reinforcements, including the battleship Barham, two cruisers,
537
and three destroyers, reached Alexandria. Taranto lies in the heel of Italy
three hundred and twenty miles from Malta. Its magnificent harbour was
heavily defended against all modern forms of attack. The arrival at Malta of
some fast reconnaissance machines enabled us to discern our prey. The
British plan was to fly two waves of aircraft from the Illustrious, the first of
twelve and the second of nine, of which eleven were to carry torpedoes, and
the rest either bombs or flares. The Illustrious released her aircraft shortly
after dark from a point about a hundred and seventy miles from Taranto. For
an hour the battle raged amid fire and destruction among the Italian ships.
Despite the heavy flak, only two of our aircraft were shot down. The rest flew
safely back to the Illustrious.
By this single stroke the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean was
decisively altered. The air photographs showed that three battleships, one of
them the new Littorio, had been torpedoed, and in addition one cruiser was
reported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyard. Half the Italian
battle fleet was disabled for at least six months, and the Fleet Air Arm could
rejoice at having seized by their gallant exploit one of the rare opportunities
presented to them.
An ironic touch is imparted to this event by the fact that on this very day the
Italian Air Force at the express wish of Mussolini had taken part in the air
attack on Great Britain. An Italian bomber force, escorted by about sixty
fighters attempted to bomb Allied convoys in the Medway. They were
intercepted by our fighters, eight bombers and five fighters being shot down.
This was their first and last intervention in our domestic affairs. They might
have found better employment defending their fleet at Taranto.
* * * * *
I kept the President well informed:
I am sure you will have been pleased about Taranto. The three
uninjured Italian battleships have quitted Taranto today, which
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
16.X1.40.
538
perhaps means they are withdrawing to Trieste.
And again:
You may be interested to receive the following naval notes on the
action at Taranto which I have asked the Admiralty to prepare:
1. This attack had been in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean?s
mind for some time; he had intended to carry it out on October
21 (Trafalgar Day), when the moon was suitable, but a slight
mishap to Illustrious led to a postponement. During his cruise in
the Central Mediterranean on October 31 and November 1, it was
again considered, but the moon did not serve and it was thought
an attack with parachute flares would be less effective. Success in
such an attack was believed to depend on state of moon,
weather, an undetected approach by the Fleet, and good
reconnaissance. The latter was provided by flying-boats and a
Glenn Martin squadron working from Malta. On the night of
November 11/12, all the above conditions were met.
Unfavourable weather in the Gulf of Taranto prevented a
repetition on 12th/13th.
2. Duplex pistols were used, and probably contributed to the
success of the torpedo attack.
3. The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported on November 11
that Italian Fleet was concentrating at Taranto in preparation for
an attack on Corfu. Reconnaissance on November 13 shows that
undamaged battleships and eight-inch-gun cruisers have left
Taranto ? presumably owing to the attack on 11th/12th.
* * * * *
I now addressed General Wavell.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
21.XI.40.
539
Chiefs of Staff, Service Ministers, and I have examined general
situation in the light of recent events. Italian check on Greek
front; British naval success against battle fleet at Taranto; poor
showing Italian airmen have made over here; encouraging
reports received of low morale in Italy; Gallabat; your own
experiences by contacts in Western Desert; above all, the general
political situation, make it very desirable to undertake operation
of which you spoke to Secretary of State for War.
It is unlikely that Germany will leave her flagging ally
unsupported indefinitely. Consequently, it seems that now is the
time to take risks and strike the Italians by land, sea, and air. You
should act accordingly in concert with other Commanders-in-
Chief.
News from every quarter must have impressed on you the
importance of Compass in relation to whole Middle East position,
including Balkans and Turkey, to French attitude in North Africa,
to Spanish attitude, now trembling on the brink, to Italy, in
grievous straits, and generally to the whole war. Without being
over-sanguine, I cannot repress strong feelings of confidence and
hope, and feel convinced risks inseparable from great deeds are
fully justified.
2. Have asked Admiralty to inquire about part assigned to Fleet.
If success is achieved, presume you have plans for exploiting it to
the full. I am having a Staff study made of possibilities open to
us, if all goes well, for moving fighting troops and also reserve
forward by sea in long hops along the coast, and setting-up new
supply bases to which pursuing armoured vehicles and units
might resort. Without wishing to be informed on details, I should
Prime Minister to General Wavell.
14.XI.40.
Prime Minister to General Wavell.
26.XI.40.
540
like to be assured that all this has been weighed, explored, and
as far as possible prepared.
It seems difficult to believe that Hitler will not be forced to come
to the rescue of his partner, and obviously German plans may be
far advanced for a drive through Bulgaria at Salonika. From
several quarters we have reports in that Germans do not approve
of Mussolini?s adventure, and that they are inclined to let him pay
the price himself. This makes me all the more suspicious that
something bad is banking up ready to be let off soon. Every day?s
delay is in our favour. It might be that Compass would in itself
determine action of Yugoslavia and Turkey, and anyhow, in event
of success, we should be able to give Turkey far greater
assurances of early support than it has been in our power to do
so far. One may indeed see possibility of centre of gravity in
Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and
from Cairo to Constantinople. You are no doubt preparing your
mind for this, and a Staff study is being made here.
As we told you the other day, we shall stand by you and Wilson
in any well-conceived action irrespective of result, because no
one can guarantee success in war, but only deserve it.
Tell Longmore that I much admire his calling-in of the southern
squadrons and accepting the risk of punishment there. If all is
well Furious and her outfit should reach Takoradi tomorrow. This
should make amends for all the feathers we have had to pull out
of him for Greece, where the part played by R.A.F. in Greek
victories has been of immense military and political consequence.
All good wishes to you both, and to the Admiral, who is doing so
splendidly. I rejoice that he should feel Suda Bay ?an inestimable
benefit.?
I suggest the following to our Ambassador in Turkey:
We have placed before you the various arguments for and
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
26.XI.40.
541
against Turkish intervention which have occurred to the Staff
officers who have reported upon the matter, but we do not wish
to leave you in any doubt of what our own opinion and your
instructions are. We want Turkey to come into the war as soon as
possible. We are not pressing her to take any special steps to
help the Greeks, except to make it clear to Bulgaria that any
move by Germany through Bulgaria to attack Greece, or any
hostile movement by Bulgaria against Greece, will be followed by
immediate Turkish declaration of war. We should like Turkey and
Yugoslavia now to consult together so as, if possible, to have a
joint warning ready to offer Bulgaria and Germany at the first
sign of a German movement towards Bulgaria. In the event of
German troops traversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian
assistance, it is vital that Turkey should fight there and then. If
she does not, she will find herself left absolutely alone, the
Balkans will have been eaten up one by one, and it will be
beyond our power to help her. You may mention that by the
summer of 1941 we hope to have at least fifteen divisions
operating in the Middle East, and by the end of the year nearly
twenty-five. We do not doubt our ability to defeat Italy in Africa.
6 P.M. The Chiefs of Staffs are in general agreement with the
above.
Furious should return home at once, and carry another load of
aircraft and pilots as reinforcement for the Middle East. Every
effort should be made to put off her refit till after she has carried
this force. C.A.S. should say what composition of force is best.
Exactly what have we got and done at Suda Bay [Cretecan be entered upon. In this
august association for collective security we must build up defence forces of
all kinds and combine our action with that of friendly Powers, so that we
may be allowed to live in quiet ourselves and retrieve the woeful
miscalculations of which we are at present the dupes, and of which, unless
we take warning in time, we may some day be the victims.
There lay in my memory at this time some lines from an unknown writer about a railway
accident. I had learnt them from a volume of Punch cartoons which I used to pore over
when I was eight or nine years old at school at Brighton.
Who is in charge of the clattering train?
The axles creak and the couplings strain;
And the pace is hot, and the points are near,
And Sleep has deadened the driver's ear;
And the signals flash through the night in vain,
For Death is in charge of the clattering train.
However, I did not repeat them.
97
* * * * *
It was not until May 22 that Mr. Baldwin made his celebrated confession. I am forced to
cite it:
First of all, with regard to the figure I gave in November of German
aeroplanes, nothing has come to my knowledge since that makes me think
that figure was wrong. I believed at that time it was right. Where I was
wrong was in my estimate of the future. There I was completely wrong. We
were completely misled on that subject.
I would repeat here that there is no occasion, in my view, in what we are
doing, for panic. But I will say this deliberately, with all the knowledge I
have of the situation, that I would not remain for one moment in any
Government which took less determined steps than we are taking today. I
think it is only due to say that there has been a great deal of criticism, both
in the press and verbally, about the Air Ministry as though they were
responsible for possibly an inadequate programme, for not having gone
ahead faster, and for many other things. I only want to repeat that whatever
responsibility there may be? and we are perfectly ready to meet criticism?
that responsibility is not that of any single Minister; it is the responsibility of
the Government as a whole, and we are all responsible, and we are all to
blame.
I hoped that this shocking confession would be a decisive event, and that at the least a
parliamentary committee of all parties would be set up to report upon the facts and upon
our safety. The House of Commons had a different reaction. The Labour and Liberal
Oppositions, having nine months earlier moved or supported a vote of censure even upon
the modest steps the Government had taken, were ineffectual and undecided. They were
looking forward to an election against ?Tory Armaments.? Neither the Labour nor the
Liberal spokesmen had prepared themselves for Mr. Baldwin's disclosures and admission,
and they did not attempt to adapt their speeches to this outstanding episode. Mr. Attlee
said:
As a party we do not stand for unilateral disarmament. We stand for
collective security through the League of Nations. We reject the use
of force as an instrument of policy. We stand for the reduction of
armaments and pooled security. We have stated that this country
must be prepared to make its contribution to collective security. Our
policy is not one of seeking security through rearmament, but
through disarmament. Our aim is the reduction of armaments, and
then the complete abolition of all national armaments and the
98
creation of an international police force under the League.
What was to happen if this spacious policy could not be immediately achieved or till it was
achieved, he did not say. He complained that the White Paper on Defence justified
increases in the Navy by references to the United States, and increases in our air force by
references to the air forces of Russia, Japan, and the United States. ?All that was oldfashioned
talk and right outside the collective system.? He recognised that the fact of
German rearmament had become dominating, but ?The measure of the counterweight to
any particular armed forces is not the forces of this country or of France, but the combined
force of all loyal Powers in the League of Nations. An aggressor must be made to realise
that if he challenges the world, he will be met by the co -ordinated forces of the world, not
by a number of disjointed national forces.? The only way was to concentrate all air power in
the hands of the League, which must be united and become a reality. Meanwhile, he and
his party voted against the measure proposed.
For the Liberals, Sir Archibald Sinclair asked the Government to summon
a fresh economic conference, and to bring Germany not only within the
political comity of nations, but also into active co-operation with ourselves in
all the works of civilisation and in raising the standards of life of both
peoples. Let the Government table detailed and definite proposals for the
abolition of military air forces and the control of civil aviation. If the
proposals are resisted, let the responsibility be cleared and properly fixed.
Nevertheless [he said to
consult together upon the conduct of the war in the Middle East
(in which they are all three concerned), and to advise me, as
Minister of Defence, upon the recommendations I should make to
the Cabinet. Will you kindly put this into the proper form? The
Secretary of State for War has agreed to take the chair.
Mr. Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troops, equipment, and
resources in the Middle East, and that the C.I.G.S. was equally perturbed. The
Committee urged the full equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt
but far below strength, and also recommended the provision of a second
armoured division at the earliest moment when it could be spared from home.
The Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions, the C.I.G.S. observing that the
moment must be chosen in relation to declining risks at home and increasing
risks abroad. On July 31, Mr. Eden considered that we might be able to spare
some tanks in a few weeks? time, and that if they were to reach the Middle
East by the end of September we might have to send them and the other
equipment through the Mediterranean. In spite of the rising tension about
invasion at home, I was in full agreement with all this trend of thought, and
brought the extremely harassing choice before the Cabinet several times.
The other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me.
Where is the South African Union Brigade of ten thousand men?
Why is it playing no part in the Middle East? We have agreed
today to send further reinforcements of Hurricanes and other
modern aircraft to the South African Air Force. What is happening
to the concert of the campaign in the Middle East? What has
Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges. 10.VII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
23.VII.40.
413
been done by the Committee of Ministers I recently set up? Now
that large naval operations are contemplated in the
Mediterranean, it is all the more essential that the attack on the
Italian position in Abyssinia should be pressed and concerted by
all means. Make sure I have a report about the position, which I
can consider on Thursday morning.
I felt an acute need of talking over the serious events impending in the Libyan
Desert with General Wavell himself. I had hot met this distinguished officer,
on whom so much was resting, and I asked the Secretary of State for War to
invite him over for a week for consultation when an opportunity could be
found. He arrived on August 8. He toiled with the Staffs and had several long
conversations with me and Mr. Eden. The command in the Middle East at that
time comprised an extraordinary amalgam of military, political, diplomatic, and
administrative problems of extreme complexity. It took more than a year of
ups and downs for me and my colleagues to learn the need of dividing the
responsibilities of the Middle East between a Commander -in-Chief, a Minister
of State, and an Intendant-General to cope with the supply problem. While
not in full agreement with General Wavell?s use of the resources at his
disposal, I thought it best to leave him in command. I admired his fine
qualities, and was impressed with the confidence so many people had in him.
The discussions, both oral and written, were severe. As usual I put my case in
black and white.
I am very much obliged to you for explaining to me so fully the
situation in Egypt and Somaliland. We have yet to discuss the
position in Kenya and Abyssinia. I mentioned the very large
forces which you have in Kenya, namely, the Union Brigade of six
thousand white South Africans, probably as fine material as exists
for warfare in spacious countries; the East African settlers, who
should certainly amount to two thousand men, thoroughly used
to the country; the two West African Brigades, brought at much
inconvenience from the West Coast, numbering six thousand; at
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell. 10.VIII.40.
414
least two brigades of King?s African Rifles (K.A.R.); the whole at
least twenty thousand men ? there may be more. Why should
these all stand idle in Kenya waiting for an Italian invasion to
make its way across the very difficult distances from Abyssinia to
the south, or preparing themselves for a similar difficult inroad
into Abyssinia, which must again entail long delays, while all the
time the fate of the Middle East, and much else, may be decided
at Alexandria or on the Canal?
Without, of course, knowing the exact conditions locally, I should
suppose that a reasonable disposition would be to hold Kenya
with the settlers and the K.A.R., and delay any Italian advance
southward, it being so much easier to bring troops round by sea
than for the Italians to make their way overland. Thus we can
always reinforce them unexpectedly and swiftly. This would allow
the Union Brigade and the two West African Brigades to come
round at once into the Delta, giving you a most valuable
reinforcement in the decisive theatre at the decisive moment.
What is the use of having the command of the sea if it is not to
pass troops to and fro with great rapidity from one theatre to
another? I am sure I could persuade General Smuts to allow this
movement of the Union Brigade. Perhaps you will let me have
your views on this by tomorrow night, as time is so short.
1. I am not at all satisfied about the Union Brigade and the West
African Brigade in Kenya. These forces as now disposed would
play no part in the critical attacks now being developed against
Egypt, Khartoum, and Somaliland. It is always considered a
capital blemish on military operations that large bodies of troops
should be standing idle while decisions are reached elsewhere.
Without further information, I cannot accept the statement that
the South African Brigade is so far untrained that it cannot go
into action. The Natal Carbineers were much further advanced in
training before the war than our British Territorials, and they
have presumably been embodied since the declaration. I cannot
see why the Union Brigade as a whole should be considered in
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell. 12.VIII.40.
415
any way inferior to British Territorial units. Anyhow, they are
certainly good enough to fight Italians. I have asked for full
particulars of their embodiment and training in each case.
2. I do not consider that proper use is being made of the large
forces in Palestine. The essence of the situation depends on
arming the Jewish colonists sufficiently to enable them to
undertake their own defence, so that if necessary for a short time
the whole of Palestine can be left to very small British forces. A
proposal should be made to liberate immediately a large portion
of the garrison, including the Yeomanry Cavalry Division. I do not
understand why the Australians and New Zealanders who have
been training in Palestine for at least six months should be able
to provide only one brigade for service in Egypt. How many of
them are there, and what are the facts of their training? These
men were brought at great expense from Australia, having been
selected as the first volunteers for service in Europe. Many of
them had previous military training, and have done nearly a year?
s training since the war broke out. How disgraceful it would be if
owing to our mishandling of this important force only one brigade
took part in the decisive operations for the defence of Egypt!
3. The two West African brigades could certainly be brought to
Khartoum via Port Soudan. It is a very good policy to mix native
units from various sources, so that one lot can be used to keep
the other in discipline. These two brigades ought to be moved
immediately to the Soudan, so that the Indian Division can be
used in Egypt or Somaliland as soon as it arrives. I do not know
why these brigades were taken away from West Africa, if the only
use to be made of them was to garrison Kenya.
4. Let me have a return of the white settlers of military age in
Kenya. Are we to believe they have not formed any local units for
the defence of their own province? If not, the sooner they are
made to realise their position the better. No troops ought to be in
Kenya at the present time other than the settlers and the K.A.R.
Considering the risks and trouble we are taking to reinforce Egypt
from home, it cannot be accepted that forces on the spot should
not be used to the highest capacity at the critical moment.
416
5. Let me have a full account of the two British divisions in the
Delta. It is misleading to think in divisions in this area, nor can
any plea that they are not properly equipped in every detail be
allowed to prejudice the employment of these fine Regular
troops.
6. Surely the statement that the enemy?s armoured forces and
vehicles can move just as easily along the desert as along the
coastal road requires further examination. This might apply to
caterpillar vehicles, but these would suffer severely if forced to
make long journeys over the rocky and soft deserts. Anyhow,
wheeled transport would be hampered in the desert unless
provided with desert-expanded india-rubber tyres of a special
type. Are the Italian vehicles so fitted, and to what extent?
7. What arrangements have been made to ?depotabilise? 1 for
long periods any wells or water supplies we do not require for
ourselves? Has a store of delayed-action fuzes been provided for
mines in roadways which are to be abandoned? Make sure that a
supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes, i.e., up to at least a
fortnight (but I hope they run longer now), are sent to Egypt by
the first ship to go through. Examine whether it is not possible to
destroy the asphalt of the tarmac road as it is abandoned by
chemical action of heavy petroleum oil, or some other treatment.
8. Let me have a statement in full and exact detail of all units in
the Middle East, including Polish and French volunteers and
arrivals.
I should be glad to discuss all these points tonight.
* * * * *
As a result of the Staff discussions on August 10, Dill, with Eden?s ardent
approval, wrote me that the War Office were arranging to send immediately to
Egypt one cruiser tank battalion of fifty-two tanks, one light tank regiment
(fifty-two tanks), and one infantry tank battalion of fifty tanks, together with
forty-eight anti-tank guns, twenty Bofors light anti-aircraft, forty-eight twenty-
417
five-pounder field guns, five hundred Bren guns, and two hundred and fifty
anti-tank rifles, with the necessary ammunition. These would start as soon as
they could be loaded. The only question open was whether they should go
round the Cape or take a chance through the Mediterranean. I pressed the
Admiralty hard, as will be seen in a later chapter, for direct convoy through
the Mediterranean. Much discussion proceeded on this latter point. Meanwhile,
the Cabinet approved the embarkation and despatch of the armoured force,
leaving the final decision about which way they should go till the convoy
approached Gibraltar. This option remained open to us till August 26, by which
time we should know a good deal more about the imminence of any Italian
attack. No time was lost. The decision to give this blood-transfusion while we
braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger, was at once awful and right. No
one faltered.
* * * * *
The following directive, which we had thrashed out together, was finally
drafted by me, and the Cabinet approved it without amendment in accord with
the Chiefs of Staff:
(General directive for Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.)
1. A major invasion of Egypt from Libya must be expected at any
time now. It is necessary, therefore, to assemble and deploy the
largest possible army upon and towards the western frontier. All
political and administrative considerations must be set in proper
subordination to this.
2. The evacuation of Somaliland is enforced upon us by the
enemy, but is none the less strategically convenient. All forces in
or assigned to Somaliland should be sent to Aden, to the Soudan
via Port Soudan, or to Egypt, as may be thought best.
3. The defence of Kenya must rank after the defence of the
Soudan. There should be time after the crisis in Egypt and the
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S. 16.VIII.40.
418
Soudan is passed to reinforce Kenya by sea and rail before any
large Italian expedition can reach the Tana River. We can always
reinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pass troops thither from
Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland.
4. Accordingly either the two West African Brigades or two
brigades of the K.A.R. should be moved forthwith to Khartoum.
General Smuts is being asked to allow the Union Brigade, or a
large part of it, to move to the Canal Zone and the Delta for
internal security purposes. Arrangements should be made to
continue their training. The Admiralty are being asked to report
on shipping possibilities in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.
5. In view of the increased air attack which may be expected in
the Red Sea following upon the Italian conquest of British
Somaliland, the air reinforcement of Aden becomes important.
6. The two brigades, one of Regulars and the other Australian,
which are held ready in Palestine should now move into the Delta
in order to clear the Palestine communications for the movement
of further reserves, as soon as they can be equipped for field
service or organised for internal security duties.
7. However, immediately three or four regiments of British
cavalry, without their horses, should take over the necessary
duties in the Canal Zone, liberating the three Regular battalions
there for general reserve of the Field Army of the Delta.
8. The rest of the Australians in Palestine, numbering six
battalions, will thus [alsoI stressed the disadvantages which an
occupation of Norway by the British would have for us: the control
of the approaches to the Baltic, the outflanking of our naval
operations and of our air attacks on Britain, the end of our pressure
on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation
of the Norwegian coast: outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of
a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917/18. The Fuehrer saw at
once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to
leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question
himself.
Rosenberg, the Foreign Affairs expert of the Nazi Party, and in charge of a special bureau
to deal with propaganda activities in foreign countries, shared the Admiral's views. He
dreamed of ?converting Scandinavia to the idea of a Nordic community embracing the
northern peoples under the natural leadership of Germany.? Early in 1939, he thought he
404
had discovered an instrument in the extreme Nationalist Party in Norway, which was led by
a former Norwegian Minister of War named Vidkun Quisling. Contacts were established,
and Quisling's activity was linked with the plans of the German Naval Staff through the
Rosenberg organisation and the German Naval Attach?in Oslo.
Quisling and his assistant, Hagelin, came to Berlin on December 14, and were taken by
Raeder to Hitler, to discuss a political stroke in Norway. Quisling arrived with a detailed
plan. Hitler, careful of secrecy, affected reluctance to increase his commitments, and said
he would prefer a neutral Scandinavia. Nevertheless, according to Raeder, it was on this
very day that he gave the order to the Supreme Command to prepare for a Norwegian
operation.
Of all this we, of course, knew nothing. The two Admiralties thought with precision along
the same lines in correct strategy, and one had obtained decisions from its Government.
* * * * *
Meanwhile, the Scandinavian peninsula became the scene of an unexpected conflict which
aroused strong feeling in Britain and France, and powerfully affected the discussions about
Norway. As soon as Germany was involved in war with Great Britain and France, Soviet
Russia in the spirit of her pact with Germany proceeded to block the lines of entry into the
Soviet Union from the west. One passage led from East Prussia through the Baltic States;
another led across the waters of the Gulf of Finland; the third route was through Finland
itself and across the Karelian Isthmus to a point where the Finnish frontier was only twenty
miles from the suburbs of Leningrad. The Soviet had not forgotten the dangers which
Leningrad had faced in 1919. Even the White Russian Government of Kolchak had informed
the Peace Conference in Paris that bases in the Baltic States and Finland were a necessary
protection for the Russian capital. Stalin had used the same language to the British and
French Missions in the summer of 1939; and we have seen in earlier chapters how the
natural fears of these small states had been an obstacle to an Anglo-French Alliance with
Russia, and had paved the way for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement.
Stalin had wasted no time; on September 24, the Esthonian Foreign Minister had been
called to Moscow, and four days later his Government signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance
which gave the Russians the right to garrison key bases in Esthonia. By October 21, the
Red Army and air force were installed. The same procedure was used simultaneously in
Latvia, and Soviet garrisons also appeared in Lithuania. Thus, the southern road to
Leningrad and half the Gulf of Finland had been swiftly barred against potential German
ambitions by the armed forces of the Soviet. There remained only the approach through
Finland.
Early in October, Mr. Paasikivi, one of the Finnish statesmen who had signed the Peace of
1921 with the Soviet Union, went to Moscow. The Soviet demands were sweeping; the
Finnish frontier on the Karelian Isthmus must be moved back a considerable distance so as
to remove Leningrad from the range of hostile artillery. The cession of certain Finnish
405
islands in the Gulf of Finland; the lease of the Rybathy Peninsula together with Finland's
only ice-free port in the Arctic Sea, Petsamo; and above all, the leasing of the port of
Hango at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a Russian naval and air base, completed
the Soviet requirements. The Finns were prepared to make concessions on every point
except the last. With the keys of the Gulf in Russian hands the strategic and national
security of Finland seemed to them to vanish. The negotiations broke down on November
13, and the Finnish Government began to mobilise and strengthen their troops on the
Karelian frontier. On November 28, Molotov denounced the Non-Aggression Pact between
Finland and Russia; two days later, the Russians attacked at eight points along Finland's
thousand-mile frontier, and on the same morning the capital, Helsingfors, was bombed by
the Red air force.
The brunt of the Russian attack fell at first upon the frontier defences of the Finns in the
Karelian Isthmus. These comprised a fortified zone about twenty miles in depth running
north and south through forest country deep in snow. This was called the ?Mannerheim
Line,? after the Finnish Commander-in-Chief and saviour of Finland from Bolshevik
subjugation in 1917. The indignation excited in Britain, France, and even more vehemently
in the United States, at the unprovoked attack by the enormous Soviet Power upon a small,
spirited, and highly civilised nation, was soon followed by astonishment and relief. The
early weeks of fighting brought no success to the Soviet forces, which in the first instance
were drawn almost entirely from the Leningrad garrison. The Finnish Army, whose total
fighting strength was only about two hundred thousand men, gave a good account of
themselves. The Russian tanks were encountered with audacity and a new type of handgrenade,
soon nicknamed ?The Molotov Cocktail.?
406
It is probable that the Soviet Government had counted on a walk-over. Their early air raids
on Helsingfors and elsewhere, though not on a heavy scale, were expected to strike terror.
The troops they used at first, though numerically much stronger, were inferior in quality
and ill-trained. The effect of the air raids and of the invasion of their land roused the Finns,
who rallied to a man against the aggressor and fought with absolute determination and the
utmost skill. It is true that the Russian division which carried out the attack on Petsamo had
little difficulty in throwing back the seven hundred Finns in that area. But the attack on the
?Waist? of Finland proved disastrous to the invaders. The country here is almost entirely
pine forests, gently undulating and at the time covered with a foot of hard snow. The cold
was intense. The Finns were well equipped with skis and warm clothing, of which the
Russians had neither. Moreover, the Finns proved themselves aggressive individual fighters,
highly trained in reconnaissance and forest warfare. The Russians relied in vain on numbers
407
and heavier weapons. All along this front the Finnish frontier posts withdrew slowly down
the roads, followed by the Russian columns. After these had penetrated about thirty miles,
they were set upon by the Finns. Held in front at Finnish defence lines constructed in the
forests, violently attacked in flank by day and night, their communications severed behind
them, the columns were cut to pieces, or, if lucky, got back after heavy loss whence they
came. By the end of December, the whole Russian plan for driving in across the ?Waist?
had broken down.
Meanwhile, the attacks against the Mannerheim Line in the Karelian Peninsula fared no
better. North of Lake Ladoga a turning movement attempted by about two Soviet divisions
met the same fate as the operations farther north. Against the Line itself a series of mass
attacks by nearly twelve divisions was launched in early December and continued
throughout the month. The Russian artillery bombardments were inadequate; their tanks
were mostly light, and a succession of frontal attacks were repulsed with heavy losses and
no gains. By the end of the year, failure all along the front convinced the Soviet
Government that they had to deal with a very different enemy from what they had
expected. They determined upon a major effort. Realising that in the forest warfare of the
north they could not overcome by mere weight of numbers the superior tactics and training
of the Finns, they decided to concentrate on piercing the Mannerheim Line by methods of
siege warfare in which the power of massed heavy artillery and heavy tanks could be
brought into full play. This required preparation on a large scale, and from the end of the
year fighting died down all along the Finnish Front, leaving the Finns so far victorious over
their mighty assailant. This surprising event was received with equal satisfaction in all
countries, belligerent or neutral, throughout the world. It was a pretty bad advertisement
for the Soviet Army. In British circles many people congratulated themselves that we had
not gone out of our way to bring the Soviets in on our side, and preened themselves on
their foresight. The conclusion was drawn too hastily that the Russian Army had been
ruined by the purge, and that the inherent rottenness and degradation of their system of
government and society was now proved. It was not only in England that this view was
taken. There is no doubt that Hitler and all his generals meditated profoundly upon the
Finnish exposure, and that it played a potent part in influencing the Fuehrer's thought.
408
All the resentment felt against the Soviet Government for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was
fanned into flame by this latest exhibition of brutal bullying and aggression. With this was
also mingled scorn for the inefficiency displayed by the Soviet troops and enthusiasm for
the gallant Finns. In spite of the Great War which had been declared, there was a keen
desire to help the Finns by aircraft and other precious war material and by volunteers from
Britain, from the United States, and still more from France. Alike for the munition supplies
and the volunteers, there was only one possible route to Finland. The iron-ore port of
Narvik with its railroad over the mountains to the Swedish iron mines acquired a new senti
mental if not strategic significance. Its use as a line of supply for the Finnish armies
affected the neutrality both of Norway and Sweden. These two states, in equal fear of
Germany and Russia, had no aim but to keep out of the wars by which they were encircled
and might be engulfed. For them this seemed the only chance of survival. But whereas the
British Government were naturally reluctant to commit even a technical infringement of
Norwegian territorial waters by laying mines in the Leads for their own advantage against
Germany, they moved upon a generous emotion, only indirectly connected with our war
problem, towards a far more serious demand upon both Norway and Sweden for the free
passage of men and supplies to Finland.
I sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I
welcomed this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic
advantage of cutting off the vital iron-ore supplies of Germany. If Narvik was to become a
kind of Allied base to supply the Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German
ships loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to Germany. Once
409
Norwegian and Swedish protestations were overborne for whatever reason, the greater
measures would include the less. The Admiralty eyes were also fixed at this time upon the
movements of a large and powerful Russian ice-breaker which was to be sent from
Murmansk to Germany, ostensibly for repairs, but much more probably to open the nowfrozen
Baltic port of Lulea for the German ore ships. I, therefore, renewed my efforts to win
consent to the simple and bloodless operation of mining the Leads, for which a certain
precedent of the previous war existed. As the question raises moral issues, I feel it right to
set the case in its final form as I made it after prolonged reflection and debate.
Norway ? Iron-Ore Traffic
Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty
16.XII.39.
The effectual stoppage of the Norwegian ore supplies to Germany ranks as a
major offensive operation of war. No other measure is open to us for many
months to come which gives so good a chance of abridging the waste and
destruction of the conflict, or of perhaps preventing the vast slaughters
which will attend the grapple of the main armies.
2. If the advantage is held to outweigh the obvious and serious objections,
the whole process of stoppage must be enforced. The ore from Lulea [in the
Baltic It can hardly be
argued that we can go on paying them till our last gasp. Surely
we ought to use this money to build more ships or buy more from
the United States in view of the heavy sinkings off the Bloody
Foreland.
Pray let me know how these subsidies could be terminated, and
what retaliatory measures could be taken in the financial sphere
by the Irish, observing that we are not afraid of their cutting off
our food, as it would save us the enormous mass of fertilisers and
feeding-stuffs we have to carry into Ireland through the De
Valera-aided German blockade. Do not assemble all the pros and
cons for the moment, but show what we could do financially and
what would happen. I should be glad to know about this
tomorrow.
I gave you and each of the C.O.S. a copy of the Irish paper. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer?s comments are also favourable, and
there is no doubt subsidies can be withdrawn at very short
notice.
We must now consider the military reaction. Suppose they invited
the Germans into their ports, they would divide their people, and
we should endeavour to stop the Germans. They would seek to
be neutral and would bring the war upon themselves. If they
withdrew the various cable and watching facilities they have,
what would this amount to, observing that we could suspend all
connections between England and Southern Ireland? Suppose
they let German U-boats come in to refresh in west coast ports of
Ireland, would this be serious, observing that U-boats have a
radius of nearly thirty days, and that the limiting factor is desire
of crews to get home and need of refit, rather than need of
refuelling and provisioning? Pray let me have your observations
on these and other points which may occur to you.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. 3.XII.40.
600
I thought it well to try to bring the President along in this policy.
North Atlantic transport remains the prime anxiety. Undoubtedly,
Hitler will augment his U-boat and air attack on shipping and
operate ever farther into the ocean. Now that we are denied the
use of Irish ports and airfields, our difficulties strain our flotillas to
the utmost limit. We have so far only been able to bring a very
few of your fifty destroyers into action on account of the many
defects which they naturally develop when exposed to Atlantic
weather after having been laid up so long. I am arranging to
have a very full technical account prepared of renovations and
improvements that have to be made in the older classes of
destroyers to fit them for the present task, and this may be of
use to you in regard to your own older flotillas.
In the meanwhile we are so hard pressed at sea that we cannot
undertake to carry any longer the 400,000 tons of feeding-stuffs
and fertilisers which we have hitherto convoyed to Eire through
all the attacks of the enemy. We need this tonnage for our own
supply, and we do not need the food which Eire has been
sending us. We must now concentrate on essentials, and the
Cabinet proposes to let De Valera know that we cannot go on
supplying him under present conditions. He will, of course, have
plenty of food for his people, but they will not have the
prosperous trading they are making now. I am sorry about this,
but we must think of our own self-preservation, and use for vital
purposes our own tonnage brought in through so many perils.
Perhaps this may loosen things up and make him more ready to
consider common interests. I should like to know quite privately
what your reactions would be if and when we are forced to
concentrate our own tonnage upon the supply of Great Britain.
We also do not feel able in present circumstances to continue the
heavy subsidies we have hitherto been paying to the Irish
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
13. XII.40.
601
agricultural producers. You will realise also that our merchant
seamen, as well as public opinion generally, take it much amiss
that we should have to carry Irish supplies through air and Uboat
attacks and subsidise them handsomely when De Valera is
quite content to sit happy and see us strangle.
* * * * *
One evening in December I held a meeting in the downstairs War Room with
only the Admiralty and the sailors present. All the perils and difficulties, about
which the company was well informed, had taken a sharper turn. My mind
reverted to February and March, 1917, when the curve of U -boat sinkings had
mounted so steadily against us that one wondered how many months? more
fighting the Allies had in them, in spite of all the Royal Navy could do. One
cannot give a more convincing proof of the danger than the project which the
Admirals put forward. We must at all costs and with overriding priorities break
out to the ocean. For this purpose it was proposed to lay an underwater
carpet of dynamite from the seaward end of the North Channel, which gives
access to the Mersey and the Clyde, to the hundred -fathom line northwest of
Ireland. A submerged mine -field must be laid three miles broad and sixty
miles long from these coastal waters to the open ocean. Even if all the
available explosives were monopolised for this task, without much regard to
field operations or the proper rearmament of our troops, it seemed vital to
make this carpet ? assuming there was no other way.
Let me explain the process. Many thousands of contact mines would have to
be anchored to the bottom of the sea, reaching up to within thirty-five feet of
its surface. Over this pathway all the ships which fed Britain, or carried on our
warfare abroad, could pass and repass without their keels striking the mines.
A U-boat, however, venturing into this minefield, would soon be blown up;
and after a while they would find it not good enough to come. Here was the
defensive in excelsis. Anyhow, it was better than nothing. It was the last
resort. Provisional approval and directions for detailed proposals to be
presented were given on this night. Such a policy meant that the diver would
in future be thinking about nothing but his air -pipe. But he had other work to
do.
At the same time, however, we gave orders to the R.A.F. Coastal Command to
dominate the outlets from the Mersey and Clyde and around Northern Ireland.
602
Nothing must be spared from this task. It had supreme priority. The bombing
of Germany took second place. All suitable machines, pilots, and material must
be concentrated upon our counter -offensive, by fighters against the enemy
bombers, and surface craft assisted by bombers against the U-boats in these
narrow vital waters. Many other important projects were brushed aside,
delayed, or mauled. At all costs one must breathe.
We shall see the extent to which this counter-offensive by the Navy and by
Coastal Command succeeded during the next few months; how we became
the masters of the outlets; how the Heinkel 111?s were shot down by our
fighters, and the U-boats choked in the very seas in which they sought to
choke us. Suffice it here to say that the success of Coastal Command overtook
the preparations for the dynamite carpet. Before this ever made any
appreciable inroad upon our war economy the morbid defensive thoughts and
projects faded away, and once again with shining weapons we swept the
approaches to the isle.
603
Suspense and Preparation ? The Forward Leap, December 7/8 ? Complete
Success ? Pleasure in Parliament ? My Messages to Mr. Menzies and General
Wavell ? ?Frappez la Masse ? ? The Gospel of St. Matthew ? Bardia, January
3 ? Tobruk, January 21 ? One Hundred and Thirteen Thousand Prisoners
and Over Seven Hundred Guns Taken ? Ciano?s Diaries ?
Syndication